Tech Uncensored – What VC’s don’t tell you: Things you have always wanted to ask.

Samie Husain (00:02)
Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome back to Altitude Accelerators Tech uncensored live podcast stream through LinkedIn. My name is Sam Husain and I will be your host today. Today we’re going to talk about what VCs don’t tell you and things you have always wanted to ask. So I’m going to right away introduce our guests. We have David Harris Kolada from GreenSoil Prop Tech Ventures and Matan Hazanov from Verstra Ventures. Thank you, gentlemen, for coming on board. I’m going to start off by asking you the first question. That is, you see hundreds and hundreds of pitches every year and right away you know you’re going to make a hard pass and you say right away, you know in the media you’re going to make a hard pass, but you’re not going to do you tell the company why you made that hard pass? And why don’t we start off with you, Dave? And then I’ll go to you, Matan.

Dave Harris Kolada (01:05)
We do as much as possible to give entrepreneurs feedback in terms of what we think of why they may not be a fit for us. That’s the easier one. If it’s just a fit issue, there’s something about with the business they’re in or their business model or the target market that isn’t in one of our priority areas. That’s easy. We’ll always give them that feedback and also to whoever referred it to us because obviously we want people to refer deals to us that are relevant to us where it has to do with quality. That’s where it’s a little trickier. And really that depends on a number of factors. One is if they took the feedback into account, would we be interested in looking at them again in the future for the next round? The answer to that question is yes. Then we will give that feedback because we’d like them to hopefully reflect it. If the answer to that is no, then there’s not a lot of upside because it can perhaps be an awkward conversation. But if they seem coachable and open to the feedback, then in my case I often will give it because I think it’s a good practice and it’s helpful for them.

Samie Husain (02:10)
That’s great attend.

Matan Hazanov (02:12)
Yeah, that was a great answer. I would say probably most of that. But I have a slightly different take on feedback in that I think in most cases where it’s like clearly not a fit for our mandate, we pass and there’s not much upside and just not a fit. There’s not much help we can provide, not much feedback we can provide that will add value to their process when it is, for whatever reason, we are not interested in investing in the business because of quality, like they suggested. We tend to shy away from feedback unless we’ve been involved with the company for a while. So if it’s like after the first meeting and it’s a hard note, we tend to avoid offering feedback we don’t want to start. What I’ve noticed is that it gets into a discussion of them trying to convince us that we’re wrong about our perspective. And sometimes it’s not because it’s something that can change, like if the founders obfuscating information and that’s why we say no. Or there one example happened recently where the founder didn’t want to share revenue, like just basic traction on their business, and it was a ten minute discussion why didn’t want to share that information.

Matan Hazanov (03:16)
And it’s a hard no for that reason. There’s not much you can do with that. And then they emailed us afterwards asking, hey, why did you guys pass? We don’t want to get to that discussion with them. So it depends on the situation. If we’re spending at least two meetings with them, we tend to offer feedback just because if we feel it can actually help them in their process.

Samie Husain (03:36)
Okay, and what would you say? Like, let’s say you do go on to spend two meetings, maybe even three meetings. If you do make a pass, what are the top reasons after you’ve gone that far, that you decide, this may not be for us? And why don’t I start off with you now, Matan

Matan Hazanov (03:53)
. If we’re ready, meeting with them a couple of times, it generally fits our mandate. So it’s not going to be because it’s another right sector, not the right technology, not the right traction. I found really three primary reasons why we will say no anytime we feel like the founder is not being realistic, and after we’ve provided that feedback. Realistic in their projections, realistic in their market size, realistic in the amount of money they need to raise. I mean, this has many elements, and they’re not accepting our feedback. That they’re accepting our feedback. Yeah, you’re right. We’re going to change what we’re doing, but they’re not even willing to hear our perspective based on years and years of experience and doing this for many years over with many companies that to us, they’re not coachable, they’re not interested in changing how they do things, not even considering it. That’s usually a no for us. The other time is if we believe it’s not a good fit with something else that we’re involved in. Like we were somewhat strategic. We’re involved with many different partners. Our investors are partners in the startup ecosystem and the software ecosystem worldwide.

Matan Hazanov (04:59)
And if we genuinely can’t find a sponsor for that investment where we can add value beyond the capital, that’s another reason that we may say no. And then the third reason is if we don’t believe it’s the right group of people, that usually means the right mix of skills, the right experience, whatever it may be.

Samie Husain (05:19)
Okay, Dave.

Dave Harris Kolada (05:24)
Another good answer, not to be repetitive, my top three were lack of competitive differentiation, and that’s a pretty broad category. Often it includes technology or IP, but not exclusively. It could just be that there’s we’ve seen a bunch of deals in a similar area. It’s just not different enough to make us want to part with our capital because we don’t think that it’s going to be able to establish enough of a beachhead in the market and to grow fast enough and to attract the kind of valuation on exit that will get us our return hurdle. So that’s a big one. We see lots of deal flow and there are certain areas where there’s lots of people trying to do something in certain areas and if that’s the case, then they have to really stand out. And if they don’t, and that’s one of the reasons why we’ll pass. The second is management, which Matan touched on. I kind of look at it as management is the reason why we say yes, but often, sometimes it’s the reason we say no, but usually we get to other things first, because the thing with management is you have to spend a fair bit of time with them to really make an assessment of their quality.

Dave Harris Kolada (06:23)
So that’s often why we say yes, but not always when we say no, because we often find other things we don’t like enough to say no before we’ve actually fully formed our view on management. But if they come across in a way that is really clear that they just don’t have the right capabilities to grow a business, then that could be a quick no. But that’s not usually the case. And then the third one is valuation and deal structure. We’re financial VCs, we have to make a high return on our winners to make up for the ones that don’t do as well. And the only thing we can control is our entry price. We can’t control the exit, we do everything we possibly can to deliver great returns on the exit, but we can’t control it. So our view is to sweat the details on what that structure looks like in terms of a preferred structure and downside protections, those kinds of things. And of course, evaluation. Up until recently, we’ve been in a very long bull market where entrepreneurs had strong, some might say unrealistic expectations that’s starting to temper as the market has shifted.

Dave Harris Kolada (07:30)
So we said no a lot to pipeline folks that thought that 20 times forward recurrent revenue multiple made sense and we never thought it did, even when the market was really hot. So that was often the reason that we said no as well, or if they’re looking for some kind of unconventional structure that we just can’t justify. So, unlike Matan, we’re a GPLP, we’re managing other people’s money, we have a fiduciary duty to them and we have to protect their investment through the way we structure our investments. So those things are important to us and there are certain things we just won’t do from a structural standpoint because from a governance perspective, we just can’t justify it.

Samie Husain (08:11)
What you’re saying is that in general, management is not necessarily the number one reason as to why you would not invest. In fact, there are multiple other reasons before you come to management. I would assume that you could no.

Dave Harris Kolada (08:25)
I didn’t say that.

Samie Husain (08:27)
Lower down. Right?

Matan Hazanov (08:28)
No.

Dave Harris Kolada (08:29)
One reason we say yes. Okay, so if you ask me what’s the most important ingredient to a successful startup that we would invest in it’s management. 100%. Number one. Number two. Number three, number four, it’s not always the first reason we say no. Your question was why did we say no?

Dave Harris Kolada (08:44)
And what I said was we often get to other things first to say no before we fully formed our view on management.

Samie Husain (08:51)
Okay, fair enough.

Matan Hazanov (08:53)
Go ahead. At peace on management. I mean, in some sense, every element of the business is a reflection of management, right? So David’s 100% correct. You don’t need to even start talking about management because if they’re in the wrong market, they have the wrong solving a solution, a problem that doesn’t exist, if they haven’t thought through how they’re raising money, they haven’t really expectations. All that is a reflection on management. By the time you ask the question of management, that is a later stage in the process. But yeah, so that’s definitely true.

Samie Husain (09:21)
What about sole founders? Do you consider sole founders, or is that a red flag? When I start with you, Dave.

Dave Harris Kolada (09:36)
We do. It doesn’t disqualify them. But this also goes to question of stage, though, right? So we’re not investing typically pre seed. We’re investing most of our capital in Series A, Series B, and then we have a bucket for seed investments. About 10% of our fund will go in and seed investments. So at that stage, they have to have other people on the team. We’re not going to be investing in a one person band. So even if they were a sole founder, by the time we’re investing, they’ve formed some kind of a team around them, and it’s not as critical. But then you’re looking at what’s the equity participation of the non founders and have they got enough skin in the game? It brings a bunch of other questions up, but no, it doesn’t. It’s not just qualification for us.

Matan Hazanov (10:22)
Matan yeah, I think conventional wisdom, to the extent such a thing exists, is that you want at least multiple founders, technical, business person, whatever. In my experience, maybe I haven’t had enough of maybe after 100 investments I can start seeing that play out. But in my experience, some of the solo founders I’ve invested in have been the best performers. So I certainly will continue to invest in solo founders. But it brings up a good point that at a certain stage, once they start raising the second or third round, they have to really figure, they have to have solid people with skin in the game, that if they’re not the technical person, they need a CTO that’s committed with skin in the game. Right. Or someone on the business side if they’re the more technical person. So yeah, that’s 100% sure. By certain stages you need to figure that out. They need to get a good group of people with the right set of skills if they want to continue to play the fundraising day.

Samie Husain (11:20)
And speaking of that is when you do see a company, and let’s say there are multiple founders, but one of them is the single founder has the vast majority of shares, does it matter to you how the shares are distributed?

Samie Husain (11:37)
That is Firstly. Secondly, do you like to see companies or founders that have put their own capital in the game, so their own skin in the game? Is that something that you value? Why don’t I start with you, Matan?

Matan Hazanov (11:51)
So I’ll start with the last question. Skin in the game is very important. My philosophy is if you want somebody to invest money in your business, you have to put your own money where your mouth is. The reality is that many people don’t have that option. So there’s many ways to show that you’re committed without actually putting in money, if that’s not a possibility for you. Right. If you have a part time job while you have to start up, that better be because you can’t eat. Otherwise you have to be especially at the early stages, at a certain point you have to be all in. Because if you want your investors to be all in with you in terms of their capital and risk it for you, you have to be all in. And that usually means for a lot of people, they have to put in their own money. Like when I started not my first business, but my first funded, so to speak, business when I was already in my mid twenty s, I refinanced my house, I quit my job and that’s how I survived. Right. Once I did that, people start to take me seriously.

Matan Hazanov (12:46)
Right? Sorry, what was the first part of that question?

Samie Husain (12:49)
And does it matter how the distribution of shareholding is amongst the founders? Does that play a role in how you value the company or how you look at it?

Matan Hazanov (12:59)
I think the important thing is that they own a significant portion of the early stages so that with dilution they still have an interest in seeing everything through difficult times. And I’ve seen situations where if they don’t have enough skin in the game, that has to be corrected at some point. So it’s either it’s going to affect you now, it’s going to affect you later, you have to make sure that they have skin in the game or else why are they doing it? Some people are just great people and they’re going to do right by their investors even if they don’t have the financial rewards. But yeah, it’s very important. It’s more the totality of the ownership rather than how it’s distributed. As long as everyone has enough skin in the game.

Dave Harris Kolada (13:39)
On the second part of your question about the first part that Matan answered, agree 100%. So nothing further down on that other than to reinforce how important it is to have scan the game. On the other part of the question, it’s actually a really fascinating topic and having done this for a lot of years, I’ve seen it play out in a number of different ways. So I got a few lessons learned. One of them is if you have three founders, for example, which often you see and they all have equal ownership and one is the CEO, I actually don’t like that. I’ve learned that that’s actually not a good formula for success because the CEO is the single biggest predictor of success in a startup and therefore they need to have the most skin in the game and they have to get the most reward and the most incentive if that happens. So I’m a little bit now at this point I’m not as keen on that, not they said I’d never do it again. But I’ve learned that that’s actually well, it seems egalitarian when they started out. It quickly turns into a management and scaling challenge because it’s like who’s really the CEO?

Dave Harris Kolada (14:40)
Do you consider yourself like a partnership where you’re really more of an organization, like a hierarchy in terms of a corporate structure? We need to have accountability as investors. We need to know who is actually in charge and who’s accountable to whom. And we’re measuring that success accordingly in terms of how we compensate them. So that’s one thing that I would say. The other thing that they can complicate the situation down the road is if one of them leaves because they’ve got this large slug of equity and they’re no longer running the business and we call that dead equity, right? When you’ve got someone that’s gone not running the business but they own a huge chunk of the company, that’s never a good thing. So we’re also wary of that. But I think in terms of and you have to make sure there’s enough equity to go around to the folks you’re going to attract later. Because as you scale the business, you have to bring talent in to do new things and new parts of the business that you get more specialized in your scale and you couldn’t do and you just weren’t that stage when you were founding.

Dave Harris Kolada (15:36)
And if you’ve got so much of the company tied up between three or four or more founders, it can be challenging sometimes to have enough for them to be able to give up enough equity to bring in a real high flyer or experienced person to head up sales or product management or whatever it might be. So in my experience, having two or three founders is great as long as the CEO has the biggest share of the equity and they have a large ESOP in place and they’re expecting to be able to use that to attract talent as they grow.

Samie Husain (16:09)
Okay. Is it fair to say or not fair to say that when you make investments and depending on what stage of course, you’re at series A and Series B, but when you make investments, let’s say it’s an early stage, your goal is not to dilute the company so much as to create a disincentive for the founders.

Matan Hazanov (16:31)
Would that be fair to say?

Samie Husain (16:32)
When I start with you, Dave.

Dave Harris Kolada (16:37)
Sorry, can you rephrase the question? Our goal is not to dilute the.

Samie Husain (16:42)
Dilute the company so much that it becomes a disincentive for the found. Right?

Dave Harris Kolada (16:49)
Yeah, absolutely. So there’s sort of rules of thumb, right, in terms of when you raise around how much of the company you’re typically going to be selling, it used to be higher. Like a third was kind of the rule of thumb. And then those valuations got higher, it was down to more like 20%, 15, 20%. So it depends. But that’s the kind of range you’re looking at, right, so that the founders are not losing so much of the company that they don’t have enough of an incentive to really grow the business. Absolutely. Yeah. And then that’s the other thing that’s interesting. When you’re evaluating really early stage companies, the single most important metric of a pre revenue company in terms of evaluation is not any kind of a business metric because there aren’t any. It’s how much money you’re raising. Right. It’s just math. It’s just like, well, you’re raising a million bucks, well, then your evaluation is probably going to be 4 million or 3 million or 5 million or whatever, because it’s just about how much of the company the new money gets. So if they’re looking to raise two or three or four or 5 million, then they’re going to have to raise it at a higher value.

Dave Harris Kolada (17:52)
And if they can’t get the market to buy into that well, then they’re going to need to find other ways to finance the company non dilutive or their own money or customer financing or whatever it might be, until they can justify that value or be willing to give up more dilution, which, you know, brings the risks that you mentioned in your question.

Samie Husain (18:10)
Yeah. Matan, what stage does Verstra come in at?

Matan Hazanov (18:17)
We invest when the company has generated enough attraction that they demonstrate some product market fit. And our definition of that for your typical B2B software business is at least a couple of hundred thousand dollars in recurring revenues. At least then we can start to engage customers and see what’s really going on.

Samie Husain (18:40)
So then it becomes really pertinent for you, is when you come in, you don’t want to dilute them to the extent that it’s a disincentive to them either, do you?

Matan Hazanov (18:50)
Yeah. Aside from the risk of the management or owners founders on having a faculty, we tend not to look at it that way. We start with what we perceive to be a good valuation. And if the company, if let’s say, comes out of 5 million free money and the company wants to raise 5 million, well, that means they’re going to get diluted by 50%. And we’re actually okay with that if we believe that there’s still enough room here for management to be incentivized. Now, that’s typically not the case. And that goes back to your earlier question regarding why we say no quickly. If a founder has unrealistic expectations, it’s actually a signal for us that it’s not a good fit. So if someone with no revenues for a typical software business wants to raise $10 million because they have inflated expectations, while we may do that, if we believe the company was worth it, that to us is a signal that it’s not a realistic fit for us because it means they’ll get diluted too much. Or maybe they have an unrealistic idea of what it takes to build a business 10 million at an early stage anyway.

Matan Hazanov (19:55)
So we tend to look at it slightly differently. We’re willing to invest whatever money and whatever valuation we think is appropriate. We tend not to look at it as dilution at certain stages or ownership percentage. We’re okay to invest 2 million and 100 million dollar valuation. It really doesn’t matter to us funds. We believe that those numbers are good.

Samie Husain (20:13)
Okay, that’s great to know. Okay, so how involved do you get with your investments? So do you actually step in and help from a management perspective if need be, to prop up the company and get it going? Or is it a hands off way? Why don’t I start with you, Matan?

Matan Hazanov (20:34)
The ideal is to add some value beyond the capital. It’s much harder to do in practice, as if you see with multiple investments in different your time is being pulled in different directions. So at the base, yes, we try to get involved in that value while understanding that we’re not operators, we’re not there to run their business and we’re not there to put our thumb on the scale in any respect whatsoever. However, we’re particularly unique in that we’re connected to about 1000 software businesses. And part of our process is, can we add value in a very real way to the companies we invest in, either through direct business relationships, connection, language, things like that. So we tend to be a bit more strategic, although we can do careful. So, yeah, we try to add value, but how it plays out, every case is different.

Samie Husain (21:28)
Dave?

Dave Harris Kolada (21:31)
We get pretty involved with our company, so I wouldn’t say we get to the point of helping management, like helping manage the company. So I would agree with Matan on that front. But in terms of our model, because we’re a vertically focused fund, we only invest in technology that’s applicable to the real estate sector. And most of our investors are corporates or strategics that invested into our fund. So we use that to help our portfolio companies in very real ways in terms of business development and getting them pilot projects and that kind of thing, but also in terms of product integrations and all kinds of other sort of insights that come from our LP network and beyond. Two of the four partners of Green Soil spent the majority of their careers in the real estate industry. One of our German, Alan Greenberg, still has an active real estate business that he runs. And so we bring that sort of up to the minute experience to our portfolio companies in terms of how to not just get the next sale, but the idea of how are you going to grow your business? What are the trends that are impacting you?

Dave Harris Kolada (22:38)
How do you hire the right people? How do you price your products? How do you position advisory competition? All those things are informed by our very deep experience within the real estate industry. So that gives us, I think, a little bit more of a hands on role. But then there’s the stuff that good VCs do. I mean, I’ve been a VC or an entrepreneur for almost 30 years, so I’ve been a CFO of a startup, I’ve raised venture rounds, I’ve been on boards of directors, I’ve worked for large strategics in the corporate M&A department and acquired startups. I partnered with startups as a large corporate. So that experience allows me to do things with our entrepreneurs and give them a perspective that I think that your average VC, if there is such a thing, perhaps doesn’t do as well. So those are the kinds of things that we think that sets us apart and I think hopefully allows us to give a little more credibility to the entrepreneur because one of the things that you have that’s a dynamic with VCs and entrepreneurs is we don’t control them, right? Like we’re not taking ownership, we’re not taking control positions, we’re taking minority positions.

Dave Harris Kolada (23:46)
So anything that we do with them is all around persuasion, influence, it’s not around command and control. So the relationship that we build is extremely important and credibility is also very important. And I think that having the experience of having done it before is important as part of building that kind of relationship and then just showing them that you put your money where your mouth is and actually providing real introductions that make an impact. And once they see you doing that, then it kind of snowballs from there.

Samie Husain (24:16)
Okay, great. How long would you say, like when you first meet a company to then making your decision to invest? What does that timeline look like in general for you? So why don’t I start with you Dave?

Dave Harris Kolada (24:31)
it varies. I would say that on average it’s probably three months, but sometimes it can be a month, sometimes it can be six. It depends on a couple of things. One is the deal already in flight and has a lead investor and they’re looking for a syndicate member and it’s a noncore investment for us which is usually a seed stage and earlier stage investment. If that’s the case, our process can be pretty quick. Right. Because there’s not that much due due diligence. It’s really around management and it’s around do we believe in the thesis and the market segment that they’re in, which we’ve probably already established, which is why we’re looking at them and it’s a small investment so that can be fairly quick. That’s probably a matter of weeks. If it’s a larger investment where we’re going to be the lead and we have to build this into getting to find co investors, that can take longer. Right. Plus we’re going to do a lot more extensive due diligence which can take more in the month time frame.

Samie Husain (25:26)
So if you’re not the lead, do you go off of the leads due diligence and you don’t do as much or you do none at all or just you do a little?

Dave Harris Kolada (25:38)
We always do our own due diligence. The point around noncore was it’s an earlier stage company where we’re investing a smaller amount. It’s not about leveraging anyone else’s diligence. We always do our own. The question is how much time does it take to do that due diligence.

Matan Hazanov (25:56)
Yeah. We have two stages to our typical investment process. We invest anywhere from half a million to $5 million per deal kind of seed in Series A to typically see in Series A stage. There’s two aspects. One is when our team decides hey, this is great, we want to bring it to our investment committee and then there’s a process to bring it to our investment committee and getting that approval. That first stage of the process depends on what’s going on. If we have a massive pipeline we may take us a month, may take us two months. It depends on really what’s going on. It depends on the factors, some of which they’ve mentioned, like is it already in players? There are competitive people around once we decide want to bring to our investment committee. That’s about a three week process where the majority of our business diligence takes place. So it could take anywhere from four to six weeks, maybe sometimes longer depending on what’s going on. If it’s a smaller check, we just started doing a $200,000 checks and less where we’re not the lead investor, where we don’t take board seats and we rely significantly on Coinvestors or the lead investor to do the diligence and to lead the route, meaning the terms and everything, negotiating the terms of all the legal dots associated with that.

Matan Hazanov (27:09)
And in those cases we can turn around decision in two weeks and plot it. And that’s really there to get a foothold in the deal that can’t be for whatever reason and then deploy significantly more capital at the.

Samie Husain (27:20)
Later stage. Of all the companies you invested in, can you point to what the key successful ingredient was in that company that made it an out of the park home run? So what was it? Was it the management team? Was it the management team and the product, the way they executed? What can you point to? Why don’t I start with you, matet?

Matan Hazanov (27:48)
I think especially the last few years have shown me that the market is actually one of the primary drivers of success. If you’re dealing in a big market with a lot of demand for a particular type of solution, that almost solves a lot of problems. Now, of course, once you have that, you need the right team to execute. They need to be agile, they need to be perseverance and grid and all that stuff. But if you’re in a bad market or if the market changes, like what we’ve experienced with shutdowns and everything, if you’re in hospitality, your business is dead. And experienced that with one of our businesses. Now, that’s obviously the end of a business. If you have the right founders on board, they can pivot and whatever, but the market plays such an important role in what you’re doing that it almost doesn’t matter what’s underlying what’s below the market in terms of the actual business itself, the market dictates so much. So I would say that that’s probably 50%. Then you have, of course, the team tech and all that stuff, but that’s just because I’m a bit salty from the past couple of years or companies didn’t do as well because they’re in a particularly bad market.

Samie Husain (28:51)
Dave?

Dave Harris Kolada (28:53)
Yeah, I would agree. I think in the view, in keeping with your theme of what VCs don’t usually tell you, honestly, right place, right time is probably the biggest driver of the Quantum, at least of a big exit. Right. It’s just, like I think back to the late 90s when I started in the venture and the.com era was raging. And, like, we sold a company with no revenue for $200 million. And it’s because we were in the right space and we were able to create competitive tension amongst a couple of buyers, and they were willing to pay a big check. Now, could anyone else have done that? Probably not, because they had some really deep tech. So that’s the other thing is, I think that once you get if you’re selling at the early stage, it’s really around how deep is your tech and how unique is it and valuable to someone who’s buying it. If you’re selling at a later stage, a company that’s in the 2030, 40, 50 million in revenue and above, then execution is so important. So I was the CFO at Eloqua, one of the first marketing SaaS companies, one of the biggest exits in Canadian startup history at almost a billion dollars.

Dave Harris Kolada (29:59)
And it was a twelve year overnight success. I mean, it took a long time to build the business to the point where we could go public and then be sold to Oracle. So how did we do that? Well, originally, the founder had a vision to do something that no one else had ever done before, which was sell marketing automation software as a service on a monthly subscription basis. No one had ever done that before. Right. But by the time we went public, it was many, many years of quarter on quarter growth and execution and drilling the business plan down and scaling the business and growing 100% per year, year on year on year on year. It’s hard work like that takes execution, so it depends on when you’re selling in terms of why you get that monster exit.

Matan Hazanov (30:41)
I want to add to it’s a great story. It’s amazing to go through that kind of cycle. We’ve invested in companies where they were, like two or three years off from the market, being ready to adopt that service or the right set of circumstances. And so long as they find the capital to make it through to that point, I mean, they can be fine. But like you said, timing is timing. So much of it.

Samie Husain (31:04)
Yeah. Well, I mean, I love to keep chatting with you gentlemen, but our time is up, and I want to thank you both. I really appreciate you coming on. And until next time, have a wonderful weekend.

Matan Hazanov (31:17)
Thank you.

Dave Harris Kolada (31:18)
Thanks. A pleasure. Thanks, Sam.

Samie Husain (31:20)
Okay, thanks.